The rational behaviors of the american and soviet union during the cuban missile crisis

The rational behaviors of the american and soviet union during the cuban missile crisis

The Russians seemed to be upping the ante, and Kennedy feared that he would lose world support and sympathy if he held out against the reasonable-sounding proposal to trade off reciprocal missile bases. Allison countered that Friedman has not provided enough evidence to demonstrate his theories actually predict anything, and criticizes his arguments as unscientific. As with a treaty signing, almost all outcomes of games that we observe have a history. The Cuban Missile Crisis had begun. National Archives, , What contingencies should be made for a likely Soviet move in Berlin? ExComm and the press debated removing the U. But in many real-life games, payoffs cannot easily be quantified and summed across the states visited. By deploying missiles, Khrushchev hoped to achieve a nuclear balance, protect Cuba from U. The Soviets simply did not have a plan to follow if the U.

Thesis[ edit ] When he first wrote the book, Allison contended that political science and the study of international relations were saturated with rational expectations theories inherited from the field of economics. One is that Castro had actively encouraged the local Soviet commander to launch the missiles against the United States without seeking prior authorization from Moscow.

Friendly governments supported the president, but many of their people feared his belligerence, and some marched in protest.

conceptual models and the cuban missile crisis summary

In Essence of Decision, Allison suggests that one reason for the popularity of rational actor models is that, compared to other models, they require relatively little data and provide researchers with an "inexpensive approximation" of the situation.

If a leader is certain enough, they will not seek input from their advisors, but rather, approval. Kennedy is elected to be the youngest president in history. The president was astonished by the report.

Essence of decision explaining the cuban missile crisis (2nd edition) pdf

Why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade? That would offend friendly ships but not hurt Cuba for months. Many Soviet missiles were installed, and the scent of crisis was in the air. A blockade of Cuba was chosen because it wouldn't necessarily escalate into war , and because it forced the Soviets to make the next move. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred Lights at the Pentagon and State Department blazed at midnight. Rules l - 4 rules of play say nothing about what causes a game to end, only when: termination occurs when a "player whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy" rule 4. To be sure, game theory allows for this kind of thinking through the analysis of "game trees," where the sequential choices of players over time are described. Thesis[ edit ] When he first wrote the book, Allison contended that political science and the study of international relations were saturated with rational expectations theories inherited from the field of economics. Condemned to Repeat? Although he had changed his mind in the interim, the downing of the U-2, unauthorized as it was, further alarmed Khrushchev and prompted him to accept the American response. The more the ExComm members talked, the less they agreed on a course of action.

It turns out that 3,3 is a "nonmyopic equilibrium" in both games, and uniquely so in Alternative, according to the theory of moves TOM.

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THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS